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Abstract This research investigates towhat extent the subjective teacher’s assessment
of children’s ability predicts children’s outcomes in the transition from primary to
secondary school in terms of initial track allocation, track switching in the first three
years of secondary education and subsequent test scores.We applymicro-data from the
Netherlands about cognitive test scores and teacher’s assessment in primary schools
and about track placement, track switching and test scores in secondary schools. Our
estimates suggest that the subjective teacher’s assessment is about twice as important
as the primary school cognitive test scores for initial track placement in secondary
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school. In addition, the teacher’s assessment is more predictive of track allocation
in 9th grade compared to cognitive test scores. Next, children who switch tracks
are more likely to be placed in tracks based on test scores. Also, test scores in 9th
grade are predicted by the subjective teacher’s assessment, not by test scores in 6th
grade.
Keywords Education · Assessment measures · Tracking
JEL Classification I21
1 Introduction
Theweight of cognitive test scores in allocating children to different levels of education
has increased over time (e.g., Kautz et al. 2014). The reason why cognitive test scores
are widely used as an assessment measure to sort children is that they are assumed
to give objective measures of ability levels. Teacher assessments represent more sub-
jective measures of ability and have been criticized for being biased; for example
towards gender, children from disadvantaged families or ethnic minorities (e.g., Dee
2005; Burgess and Greaves 2013; Fairlie et al. 2014). However, teacher assessments
could also be valuable complements to cognitive test scores. Teachers work with chil-
dren on a daily basis, which allows them to also assess other determinants of ability,
such as motivation and classroom behaviour (e.g., Segal 2008).
This research investigates to what extent a teacher’s assessment contains additional
information that is useful in determining primary school children’s ability level on top
of the information provided by cognitive test scores. We make use of a database that
contains information about cognitive test scores and teacher assessment in primary
school and about initial track placement and subsequent careers in secondary school of
Dutch children. TheNetherlands has an educational system that involves early tracking
(i.e., tracking at the age of 12) after the completion of primary school. Most children
start primary school at the age of 4, enter 1st grade at the age of 6 and finish primary
school at the age of 12. As of secondary school children are allocated to tracks. The
track allocation decision is made by the secondary school. It is based on test scores
and teacher assessment. Our empirical analysis benefits from this system because we
observe both high-stakes cognitive test scores and teacher assessments at the end of
6th grade and the transition from primary to secondary school during which children
are allocated to different (hierarchical) education tracks.
The research strategy involves three steps. The first step is to document whether
or not there are non-random differences between cognitive test scores and teacher
assessment at the individual level. In the second step we investigate whether or not
cognitive test scores or the teacher’s assessment ismorepredictive of trackplacement in
7th grade and track allocation in 9th grade. In a complementary analysis we document
the determinants of math and language test scores in 9th grade by correlating them
with both ability signals. In the third step we investigate whether track switchers
(between 7th and 9th grade) have been allocated according to the teacher’s assessment
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or cognitive test scores.1 The application of the assessment measures by secondary
schools to allocate children to different tracks (or the lack thereof) yields information
about the usefulness of objective and subjective assessment measures in allocating
children.
Our database for the empirical analysis includes 4500 children. It includes admin-
istrative data from school tracking systems and survey data of children in 6th and 9th
grade in the period 2009–2012 (i.e., these children were in 6th grade in 2009 and were
followed until 9th grade in 2012).More specifically, the data include both objective and
subjective assessment measures in 6th grade, track placement from 7th to 9th grade,
test scores on an identical test across all different tracks in 9th grade and measures
about demographic factors as well as socio-economic status. The objective assessment
measure is a high-stakes standardized test score (so-called Cito Eindtoets) which chil-
dren take in 6th grade. This objective test score provides a well-defined measure of
levels of achievement and is annually taken by almost all 6th grade children in the
Netherlands.2 The subjective assessment measure is the teacher’s assessment of the
child’s ability level. This subjective assessment is made by teachers in 6th grade after
they have observed the test score from the objective assessment.
Our four most important findings can be summarized as follows. First, for 19% of
our sample we observe a substantial difference between the objective and subjective
assessmentmeasure of ability in 6th grade. In three quarters of these cases the teacher’s
assessment is higher than the test score. We find that there are systematic differences
between the objective and subjective assessment measure. Our most important find-
ings relate to gender and social-economic status. Girls are more likely to receive a
teacher assessment that is higher than their test score compared to boys and children
from families with lower socio-economic status are less likely to receive a teacher
assessment that is higher than the test score compared to children from higher level
families.3
Second, our estimates suggest that the teacher’s assessment is twice as powerful
to explain the gap between the lowest and the highest track placement compared to
the test score, in both 7th and 9th grade. These results suggest that secondary schools
put more emphasis on the subjective assessment measure relative to the objective
assessment measure when allocating children to tracks in 7th grade. It also suggests
that the teacher’s assessment is not only more predictive of initial track placement
but also of the longer term career in secondary school compared to the cognitive test
1 The benefits of an early tracking system are highest when children are allocated to tracks most suitable
given their ability level and that they stay within this track throughout their secondary school careers.
These seem to be the most important reasons for early tracking in for example Germany (e.g., Woessmann
2004) and the Netherlands (e.g., Diris 2012), two countries that track children the earliest among all OECD
countries.
2 Approximately 85% of all children who are in 6th grade participate in the Cito Eindtoets every year.
3 These numbers are consistent with previous studies using data about the Dutch education system. For
example, Timmermans et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between assessmentmeasures and secondary
school careers. They use a different dataset, which contains information about children from all regions
in the Netherlands but no information on track placement and switching. Their descriptive statistics about
assessment measures are similar to ours, which suggests that our analysis is likely to be representative for
the Netherlands. Golsteyn and Schils (2014) show that boys and girls score differently on the 6th grade
tests according to differences in personality that might also be related to higher teacher assessments.
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score. In addition, secondary schools seem to allocate children in accordance with the
highest assessment signal of ability. Finally, our estimates are conservative or lower-
bound estimates as we only consider eight different educational tracks in secondary
education for these analyses and are very strict in labelling signals as different.4
Third, we observe that the teacher’s assessment has non-random deviations from
the test score. The question is whether these non-random deviations are efficient with
respect to later outcomes, such as switching tracks. We observe that approximately
24% of our sample makes a switch between tracks between 7th and 9th grade. Our
analysis suggests that children who are allocated according to the teacher’s assessment
are the least likely to switch tracks.
Finally, the estimates suggest that the teacher’s assessment positively correlates
with the 9th grade test scores, whereas the cognitive test score in 6th grade does
not explain test scores in 9th grade (when controlling for the teacher’s assessment).
Switching tracks between 7th and 9th grade seems to have a negative effect on the test
score in 9th grade, pointing towards costs of switching.
This paper contributes to the literature about the consequences of using objective
and subjective assessment measures for tracking and successive performance. Dee
(2005), Lindahl (2007), Lavy (2008), Gibbons and Chevalier (2008), Cornwell et al.
(2012) and Burgess and Greaves (2013) all use objective and subjective assessment
measures to study discrimination and uncertainty. It is shown that systematic differ-
ences exist between these two types of instruments in the assessment of children’s
performance, such as between boys and girls, or between blacks and whites. Bernardi
et al. (2014) show that additional information from cognitive and non-cognitive tests
is able to help children make a more efficient track allocation choice. Our contribution
to this literature is that we analyse differences in both assessment measures for track
allocation and switching, where we are able to observe children’s later outcomes in
9th grade in the form of track allocation, track switches and their scores on a math and
language test.
Other studies have shown that test scores in secondary school are predictive of
labour-market outcomes (e.g., Murnane et al. 1995; Currie and Thomas 1999). We
obtain a set of estimates suggesting that switching seems to lead to lower test scores
in 9th grade. This seems to support arguments that switching tracks harms children’s
accumulation of human capital, which is documented in van Elk et al. (2009) and Diris
(2012) for the Netherlands.
Our work also contributes to the literature on early school tracking. The long-run
effects of early tracking for human capital development and educational opportunities
have been summarized byHanushek andWoessmann (2006) andBrunello andChecchi
(2007). According to the OECD, the early tracking regime in the Netherlands causes
a severe constraint for the growth of higher education participation. It states that “In
the end, postponement of the present early tracking regime seems inevitable; although
this is a major change in the way Dutch society thinks of itself” (OECD 2007, p. 38).
Consistent with this advice, other studies using Dutch data suggest that relatively low-
4 We group the tracks in pre-vocational education which leads to eight educational tracks as the number of
children allocated to each of these tracks is relatively low. This decreases the variation in the data compared
to analyzing 11 educational tracks.
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ability children could improve their educational outcomes by about 30% points when
tracking is postponed by one year. At the same time, most children do not seem to
be hurt by the presence of low-ability children in the first year of secondary school.
Only children who are considered to have the highest ability seem to be hurt by the
presence of lower ability peers (e.g., van Elk et al. 2009; Diris 2012). We show that a
substantial fraction of our population is not allocated to the right track, which seems
akin to restraints on optimal human capital development.
Weproceed as follows. First,we present background features of theDutch education
system and explore the research strategy. Section 3 documents the data description
and statistics of our core variables. Sections 4–6 present the results on the differences
between objective and subjective assessment measures, track switching and 9th grade
test scores. Section 7 briefly addresses the policy perspective of our analysis with a
focus on reducing switching. Section 7 concludes. We present additional results and
detailed data descriptions in the online appendix to this paper.
2 Background and Strategy
We observe five main outcomes for each child: the test score which serves as an
objective assessment of ability at the end of primary school (6th grade), the primary
school teacher’s assessment which serves as a subjective assessmentmeasure of ability
(6th grade), track allocation in the first and third year of secondary education (7th and
9th grade), the results from a cognitive test in 9th grade, and track switching in the
first three years of secondary education (7th–9th grade). We now present information
on these measures and information about the Dutch education system.
2.1 Dutch Education System
Countries differ in the age at which they first track children into different types of
schools. In the majority of OECD countries, tracking takes place between the ages of
14–16. Some countries, including the Netherlands, undertake the first tracking at the
age of 12 when children progress from primary to secondary school (i.e., from 6th to
7th grade).5 We take advantage of this system by studying the allocation in secondary
school, the transition from primary to secondary school and performance in 9th grade.
5 Research has been conducted to investigate the effects of early tracking on differences in human capital
formation and educational opportunities (e.g., Hanushek andWoessmann 2006; Brunello and Checchi 2007
for comprehensive review studies). The overall conclusion of these investigations has been that the earlier
the tracking, the greater the impact of socio-economic factors, such as parental education, on educational
outcomes and opportunities. For the Netherlands, van Elk et al. (2009) and Diris (2012) find that early
tracking reduces participation in and completion of education for relatively low-ability children placed in
lower tracks at the age of 12, while there does not seem to be a positive effect on those placed in the
higher tracks. Furthermore, Korthals and Dronkers (2016) argue that in countries with highly differentiated
tracking systems, such as the Netherlands, students perform best when track placement is based on prior
performance. Our paper investigates these prior measures of performance. One of the main reasons of
implementing an educational system with early tracking is to provide children with a learning environment
in which they benefit from classrooms with homogenous populations. Such populations would benefit from
peer effects. In addition, it allows for a focused curriculum and appropriately paced instructions.
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Fig. 1 Tracks in secondary education in The Netherlands. Note: The left-hand side shows the three major
tracks from high (T3) to low (T1). The T1 track is subdivided into four sub-tracks. The right-hand side of
the figure shows the 11 tracks to which children can be allocated in 7th grade and the objective assessment
measure (test score) in the brackets that belongs to each of these tracks
In the Netherlands primary education consists of eight years of which the first two
are spent in kindergarten. As of the third year of primary school (i.e., 1st grade),
children formally learn how to read and write. Most children start kindergarten at the
age of 4, enter 1st grade at the age of 6 and finish primary school at the age of 12. As
of secondary school children are allocated to tracks. The track allocation decision is
made by the secondary school. It is based on test scores and the teacher’s assessment.
Some schools set a threshold test score level below which children are not allowed to
enter a certain level of secondary education.
The Dutch secondary education system is hierarchically structured by ability and
consists of three main tracks that differ in duration and qualification (see the left-
hand column of Fig. 1). The four-year track (VMBO or T1) qualifies children for
vocational education, the five-year track (HAVO or T2) qualifies children for higher
vocational education and the six-year track (VWO or T3) qualifies children for uni-
versity education. The next column in Fig. 1 shows four sub-tracks at the lowest level
of secondary education (T1a–T1d). The difference between these four sub-tracks is
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the importance of a practical versus theoretical focus in the curriculum. Time spent
on more theoretically oriented courses increases with the tracks from T1a to T1d.6
The third columnofFig. 1 shows all possible tracks, someofwhich are combinations
of the three major tracks. Both the objective and subjective assessment measure are
tailored toward allocating children into one of these 11 track combinations. The 6th
grade test distinguishes bracketswhich are consistentwith these 11 track combinations,
shown in the fourth column of Fig. 1. Teacher assessment is measured on the same
11-point scale.
2.2 Background
In 6th grade, all children have to take an objective assessment test. Schools are free
to choose which test their children take. Approximately 85% of all Dutch children
complete the Cito Eindtoets. We use results from this Cito Eindtoets for our analysis.
The children in our data have taken this test in 2009. The test is standardized, meaning
that the test procedure is the same for the whole country. During the assessment
children have to answer questions in the areas of math, reading, study skills and
science. The performance is measured on a scale between 501 and 550.
The aim of the cognitive test score is to provide an independent and appropriate
perspective on children’s expected performance and their best track placement in
secondary education. The test institute offers guidelines for children’s track allocation
by reporting brackets of scores and accompanying track assessments. We followed
these guidelines for constructing our objective ability measure variable. We use the
brackets as the outcome measure of the objective assessment measure.
High scores on the standardized test are an important way in which primary schools
try to signal the quality and value-added of their educational efforts. Primary schools
seem to use their average scores on this test to attract new children. In addition, the
Dutch Education Inspectorate uses these results, controlled for individual character-
istics, as one of the inputs for their overall evaluation of the school’s quality and
value-added. Children also have an incentive to obtain a high test score because it is
an important signal of their ability. In that sense, the test is a high-stakes assessment.
In addition to the objective test score, teachers make a personal assessment of
each child’s level of ability. The assessment is based on the teacher’s experience
and interaction with the child, observable demographic and socio-economic factors
and the child’s performance throughout all grades in primary school. Teachers also
know the test score at the time they make their assessment of the child’s ability. The
subjective assessment is provided in the spring of 2009 before children apply to a
secondary school. The teacher’s assessment is provided in similar brackets as the
objective assessment and fits with possible track allocations in secondary schools.
Primary school teachers do not have a strong incentive for strategic behaviour in
such a way that their assessment overstates the child’s ability. The teacher’s compen-
6 The six-year track (T3) can also be divided into two sub-tracks of which one includes the option to take
courses in Greek and Latin. Our data do not allow us to distinguish between these two sub-tracks, which
means that we combine them in T3. In practice, test scores and teacher assessment do not distinguish the
two tracks.
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sation scheme does not depend on the assessments made. Furthermore, the primary
school’s population usually goes to the same secondary schools every year. Thismeans
that over time the information asymmetry between the primary and the secondary
schools reduces and secondary schools learn how to interpret the assessments from
primary schools. Furthermore, each year children are assigned to a class in which
they are taught by one primary school teacher. This teacher is involved in teaching all
subjects in primary school. Differences in test scores across different parts of the test
are therefore unlikely to be driven by different teacher characteristics.
Secondary schools allocate children to tracks. They obtain the information about the
objective and subjective assessment measures. Secondary schools have an incentive to
allocate children to the track that matches their ability level. Inputs for the Education
Inspectorate evaluation of secondary schools’ performance include the percentage of
children who graduate every year as well as the percentage of children who switch
tracks. Allocating children to tracks that are too high (too low) leads to switching
downward (upward) and would induce negative (positive) evaluations on this part of
the performance assessment. Nevertheless, secondary schools also benefit fromhaving
more children in the higher tracks as this is beneficial for signalling the quality of the
schools’ education, which potentially helps to attract more children.
2.3 Strategy
Our analysis first focuses on the way in which both the objective and subjective
assessment measures in 6th grade help to explain track placement in 7th grade. Both
assessment measures aim to measure ability, but face the problem that the true under-
lying and unobserved level of ability is unknown. The test score (TSi ) is used as the
objective assessment measure of the child’s (i) ability. This test score depends on the
child’s true and unobserved ability (Ai ), a vector of observed characteristics (Xi ) and
the primary school he attends (Pi ).
In an ideal world TSi = Ai . In practice this is not the case because TSi is measured
with noise and observed characteristics Xi are likely to influence the measurement
of Ai by TSi . The reason for adding school fixed effects (or dummies in our cross-
sectional specifications) is that characteristics of primary schools can be related to
test results of children in 6th grade, which can influence TSi . Some of these school
characteristics we cannot observe. Hence, we add school fixed effects (βPi ) to the
model.
The teacher’s assessment (TAi ) is used as the subjective assessment measure of
the child’s ability. This measure includes the same ingredients plus the observed test
score. The information about the child’s test score influences the teacher’s assessment
of the child’s ability. Because children are assigned to one teacher in the final year of
primary education and most primary schools have only one 6th grade class, potential
teacher effects are captured by school fixed effects. This is also the reason for indexing
all variables with child i and for ignoring teacher j effects.
Finally, we observe the child’s initial track placement (TPi ) in 7th grade (at sec-
ondary school) and thereafter allocation in 9th grade. The decision about initial
placement is made by the secondary school and includes the objective and subjec-
123
Does the Teacher Beat the Test? The Value of the... 399
tive assessment measures. Adding secondary school fixed effects to the model would
create additional endogeneity as not all schools offer the same track levels and sec-
ondary school fixed effects are related to TSi and TAi .
In the first part of the empirical analysis we analyse whether there are any system-
atic differences between the test score, the teacher’s assessment and track placement
for various socio-economic background characteristics of children. We are primarily
interested in explaining track placement. We estimate equation (1) with an ordered
probit model to find the determinants of track placement in both 7th and 9th grade. We
do not observe Ai but two signals TSi and TAi . In the empirical analysis we incorporate
the possibility that secondary schools take into account both TSi and TAi , although
TAi includes information about TSi . In this way we have the two signals competing
with each other. A statistically significant coefficient of TSi would in all likelihood
suggest that secondary schools put weight on both signals of ability. The equation we
first estimate is:
TPi = C1 + a1Xi + a2TSi + a3TAi + βPi + εi , (1)
where εi is the error term.
In the second part of the empirical analysis we estimate the determinants of track
switching in the first three years of secondary school (i.e., in the period spanning 7th,
8th and 9th grade). To do so, we first estimate a set of probit models in which we
show what type of children tend to switch tracks. Second, we estimate probit models
in which we estimate the probability of switching tracks (SWi ) for child i :
SWi = C2 + b1Xi + b2TSi + b3TAi + b4TPi + γSi + μi , (2)
where μi is the error term. We estimate different versions of the model in which the
dependent variable is switch, switch up or switch down. We only include secondary
school fixed effects (γSi ) because switching takes place in secondary school. We show
below that primary school fixed effects have no impact on track placement, which
makes us confident that including only secondary school fixed effects is sufficient to
estimate the determinants of switching.
Finally, we estimate models to investigate to what extent test scores on an identical
(low-stakes) test in 9th grade are correlated with the ability signals from the teacher
and the test score in 6th grade. We also estimate to what extent switching is correlated
with test scores in 9th grade.
The strength of the data at our disposal is that we are able to observe performance
in both primary and secondary school. In addition, we have detailed information about
teacher assessments and initial track placement in secondary school. This is a unique
feature in the literature. Nevertheless, the analysis is constrained by the fact that we
are not able to identify a source of exogenous variation in our data. Ideally, one would
want to conduct an experiment in which a random portion of the sample was placed
according to the test scores’ signal, another part according to the teacher’s signal and
a final slice of the population as it is currently done (i.e., decided by the secondary
school). The alternative is to find instruments to dealwith the “self-fulfilling prophecy”
that creates endogeneity. The “self-fulfilling prophecy” is the idea that when a child
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is placed on a higher or lower track than he should be according to his true ability, the
child is more likely to switch back to the track that matches his true ability. This is to
be kept in mind when interpreting the results in the switching section. Furthermore,
all tests, but also the teacher’s assessment, contain measurement error and analyses
concerning ability suffer from omitted variable bias. However, such instruments are
not readily available. Our analyses focus on outcomes between 6th and 9th grade. In
order to find exogenous variationwewould need a set of instruments related to (one of)
our assessment measures and at the same time unrelated to any unobservable variables
that might influence our outcome variable. Since children’s true ability is unobserved,
this is problematic. We are aware of the endogeneity concerns with respect to omitted
variable bias and also with the fact that potential measurement error is an important
disclaimer when interpreting the estimated coefficients, but try to deal with this in the
best way possible by using primary and secondary school fixed effects and a rich set
of covariates, including track placement in 7th grade.
3 Data
Before we present our results, we first document the most salient features of our data
to reveal information about the allocation of children and to present a number of key
descriptive statistics. More information as well as additional regression analyses are
presented in the online appendix to this paper.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
For the analyses we use a unique dataset on the educational development of children in
a given region (Limburg) of the Netherlands. These data are collected in a cooperative
project between (primary and secondary) schools, school boards, municipalities and
Maastricht University to analyse school performance in order to foster educational
improvement. The unique feature of this project is the participation of almost all
schools in the region, implying almost full coverage of children (about 95% of the
primary schools participate and about 90% of the secondary schools in the region).
In 2009, information about all 6th grade children was collected and these children
were again reviewed when they were in 9th grade in 2012. In both years the data
collection includes administrative data from the school information systems, surveys
among children and their parents and test results. The data covers children from all
tracks with the exception of those who are in special needs education.
Table 1 documents the distribution of test scores TSi in 7th and 9th grade, teacher
assessment TAi , and (initial) track placement TPi , across the 11 different tracks (see
Fig. 1). The numbers in each row add up to 100%. In addition, the table documents the
number of switchers from the initial track to which they are allocated in 7th grade. The
numbers represent the fraction of children who switch away from each of these tracks.
The distribution of test scores and teacher assessment seems to be broadly consistent
but there are also important differences. Track placement and teacher assessment at
higher levels of secondary education is different from the test scores, with almost a
quarter of the sample being placed in T3 in 7th grade. Teacher assessment seems to
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Table 1 The distribution of test scores, teacher assessment, track placement and switching
Track
T1a T1a/b T1b T1b/c T1c T1c/d T1d T1d/2 T2 T2/3 T3
TSi 2.00 2.62 3.87 2.76 6.33 9.07 7.11 13.98 20.49 18.96 12.82
TAi 4.00 3.27 4.53 0.31 0.11 5.18 10.96 12.33 18.02 16.62 24.67
TPi 2.69 3.11 7.27 0.00 1.53 1.84 10.73 10.84 11.07 25.93 24.98
SWi 3.59 0.21 11.30 0.00 7.29 5.28 19.01 10.35 12.99 9.93 20.06
TSi 9th 1.21 2.21 4.14 0.00 1.88 1.38 11.70 11.31 9.82 29.14 27.12
All rows add up to 100. n = 4500 except for SWi where n = 4019 and TSi 9th where n = 1812. See
Fig. 1 for a schedule of the different educational tracks. TSi is the objective assessment measure based on
the Cito Eindtoets (test score) in 6th grade. TAi is the subjective assessment measure based on the teacher
advice in 6th grade. TPi is track placement in 7th grade. SWi is a measure of switching. The numbers in
this row show the fraction of children that switch away from this track after initial placement in 7th grade.
TSi 9th is the test score in 9th grade on math or language
be more favourable for the higher tracks compared to the test score. We explore these
differences further in Sect. 4.
Furthermore, teachers seem to be reluctant to advise tracks in the middle tracks
of vocational education (i.e., tracks in T1). As can be observed from Table 1, some
T1 sub-tracks contain only few observations. These are combination tracks to which
only a few children are allocated.7 We merge the combination tracks and the regular
tracks for T1 when analysing differences between TSi and TAi . This means that for the
analysis of track allocation we merge tracks T1a and T1a/T1b, T1b and T1b/T1c and
T1c and T1c/T1d into three categories. This results in a more conservative estimate of
the determinants of allocation in Sect. 4. As the difference between TSi and TAi does
not have a direct impact on the number of children who switch tracks, we use 11 tracks
for the analyses of switching tracks. We define differences in TSi , TAi and TPi when
there is a difference of at least two tracks. Furthermore, we define a switch between
tracks when children switch at least two tracks. For example, if children switch from
track T2 to track T1d/T2 or track T2/T3 this is not defined as a switch. When children
switch from track T2 to track T1d or track T3 this is defined as a switch.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. In 6th grade children are on average 12 years
old. The majority of children (and their parents) were born in the region (Limburg).
The average parental education level suggests that they have completed vocational
education. Almost all fathers are employed and work fulltime. Mothers more often
report to be unemployed, orwork part-time. In TheNetherlands, part time employment
is an important form of employment for women with young children (e.g., Bosch et al.
2010). Almost 80% of the children in our sample live with both parents in 9th grade.8
Teacher assessment, track placement and test score (short) are all measured on a
scale from 1 to 8. The original test score in 6th grade is measured on a scale from
501 to 550. Based on test score ranges provided by the institution that supplies the
7 It is possible that this is related to the availability of this type of school track in the area.
8 The corresponding survey question is: “Do you live at home with both parents?”.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the empirical analysis
N Mean SD Min Median Max
Female 4422 0.51 0.50 0 1 1
Age (years) 4500 12.06 0.55 10 12 14.75
Region of birth child
1. Limburg 89.1%
2. The Netherlands 6.7%
3. Abroad 4.2%
3943 1.15 0.46 1 1 3
Region of birth father 3923 1.36 0.67 1 1 3
Region of birth mother 3935 1.35 0.67 1 1 3
Education father
1. Lower education 26.2%
2. Vocational education 32.1%
3. Higher education 18.9%
4. University 22.8%
3752 2.38 1.10 1 2 4
Education mother 3763 2.22 1.03 1 2 4
Labour market position father
1. Employed 93.8%
2. Unemployed 2.0%
3. Sick/unable to work 2.5%
4. Other 1.7%
3858 1.12 0.51 1 1 4
Labour market position mother 3869 1.48 1.04 1 1 4
Workdays per week father
1. Part-time 1–2 days 0.2%
2. Part-time 3–4 days 8.3%
3. Fulltime 91.5%
3249 2.91 0.29 1 3 3
Workdays per week mother 2848 2.31 0.62 1 2 3
Living with both parents 3608 0.79 0.41 0 1 1
Teacher assessment 4500 5.6 2.15 1 6 8
Track placement 4500 5.75 2.16 1 7 8
test in 6th grade, we rescaled the test score to a scale from 1 to 8. Average test score
and average test score (short) correspond to a T1d/T2 track (vmbo-t/havo). Average
teacher assessment and average track placement correspond to a T2 track (havo).
Almost 24% of children switch tracks between 7th and 9th grade. The majority of the
switches happen in the pre-vocational track.
Finally, we use information about a math and language test that children in our
sample have taken in 9th grade. This test was a low-stakes test and part of the research
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Table 2 continued
N Mean SD Min Median Max
Test score 4500 538.67 8.03 504 540 550
Test score (short) 4500 5.21 2.02 1 6 8
Switching 4019 0.24 0.42 0 0 1
The same description of region of birth of the child applies to the father and mother. Similarly, the same
description of education father, labor market position father and workdays per week father apply to the
mother. The parental education level is measured as the highest completed level of education and measured
in four different categories: (1) lower education, (2) vocational education, (3) higher education and (4)
university education. The parental labor-market position is measured in four categories: (1) employed, (2)
unemployed, (3) sick/unable to work and (4) not in the labor force. The number of workdays per week
of the parents is a measure of the amount of time allocated to paid work. Working time is defined in
three categories: (1) part-time 1–2days per week, (2) part-time 3–4 days per week and (3) fulltime. The
corresponding survey question for living with both parents is: “Do you live at home with both parents?”
project conducted at the schools in our sample. It main purpose was to have a school-
independent test score for students in 9th grade. The difficulty level of the test differs
according to the students’ track level. Sincewewant to compare the effect of switching
tracks across trackswe only use the questions onmath or language that are identical for
all students.9 We observe that the correlations among teacher assessment, test scores
and track placement are high and positive.10 Interestingly, track placement shows a
higher positive correlation with teacher assessment than with test scores. Furthermore,
we observe a negative correlation between switching tracks and the test score, teacher
assessment and track placement.
3.2 Possible Selection
Data has been collected from 155 primary schools (95% of all schools in the given
region) and 30 secondary schools (90% of all schools in the given region). This results
in a database of n = 4500 for the first section, n = 4019 for the second section and
n = 1812 for the third section of the empirical analyses of this paper. In the first section
of the empirical analyses we discuss non-random differences between the test score,
the teacher assessment and track placement in 7th and 9th grade. In the second section
of the empirical analyses we discuss track switching because mistakes in initial track
placement or suboptimal allocation can be made undone in the first part of secondary
education. In the third section we correlate both ability signals and switching with 9th
grade test scores. Data has been collected for 9092 children. For the analyses in the
9 This leaves us with 11 questions on math and 8 questions on language. Since we do not have enough
observations for all tracks, we only look at students in track T1c, T1d, T2 and T3 in relation to their score
on the math or language test. The average percentage of questions answered correctly increases from 34
in track T1c to 49 in track T3. The standard deviation is around 20% in all tracks. The distribution of the
test score in 9th grade is presented in the last row of Table 1. The row adds up to 100% and shows the
percentage of students per initial track placement in 7th grade.
10 A full correlation table of all variables of interest and a detailed description of the covariates can be
found in the online appendix.
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first section of the paper we only use those children for whomwe observed the teacher
assessment and the test score in our data. For the analyses in the second section we
also need to know children’s track placement in 7th, 8th and 9th grade, which reduces
the sample size to 4019. Finally, 9th grade test scores are available for 1812 children.
We address possible selection issues with regard to the sample we use for our
analyses. We investigate whether individual characteristics are able to predict whether
children end up in our sample for analyses. We are mainly concerned about schools
only reporting data for their well performing children and holding back information
on other children. After controlling for school fixed effects we find that individual
characteristics are not significantly related to selection into our sample. We conclude
that selection is not an issue (see the online appendix B for a more elaborate analysis).
4 Track Placement
This section presents our first set of estimation results. We first investigate to what
extent there are non-random differences between the objective and subjective assess-
ment measures. Second, we present a set of estimates about the determinants of track
placement in 7th and 9th grade.
4.1 Differences Between Objective and Subjective Assessment Measures
To compare differences between our objective and subjective assessment measures we
have created three categories: TAi < TSi , TAi = TSi and TAi > TSi . About 81% of
the children in our sample is facedwith objective and subjective assessment scores that
are equal. If there is no systematic difference between the teacher assessment and the
test score, we would expect both assessments to be equal on average. Any deviations
should be approximately symmetric. However, we observe that it is more likely that
the subjective assessment measure is higher when there is a difference between the
two measures. In 5.1% of the cases the subjective assessment is lower compared to
the objective assessment, in 13.9% it is higher. Since the teacher assessment makes
use of the information revealed by the test score, the teacher has access to a child’s
educational history in primary school and has knowledge about a child’s background
characteristics and earlier test scores, she has an information advantage.11
When we look into the differences between the test score, teacher assessment and
track placement in 7th grade, we find that most of the differences we observe are
related to gender and social-economic status.12 First, we observe that girls seem more
likely to receive a teacher assessment that is higher compared to the test score, while
they seem less likely to receive a teacher assessment that is lower compared to the
test score. In addition, girls are more likely to receive a track placement equal to the
subjective assessment measure and more likely to have a test score that is lower com-
11 If we use 11 different tracks instead of 8, 32.9% of all children is faced with different assessment
measures. Of these children 83% receives a higher subjective assessment measure of ability.
12 Table C1 and C2 in the online appendix show descriptive statistics and estimated marginal effects from
ordered probit models.
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pared to their track placement. This suggests that girls not only get a more favourable
assessment from the primary school teacher, but also with regard to track placement in
secondary school. Second, from the labour market position of the mother we observe
that children who have mothers who are unemployed are less likely to receive a sub-
jective assessment that is higher than the objective assessment. These children are also
less likely to have a test score that is lower than their initial track placement and more
likely to receive a track placement that is equal to their test score. Furthermore, chil-
dren of mothers who are sick or unable to work are less likely to receive a subjective
assessment that is higher than the objective assessment. These children are also less
likely to receive a test score that is lower than their track placement and more likely to
receive a track placement that is equal to or lower than their objective assessment. This
indicates that secondary schools seem to allocate these students unfavourably. In our
data over 70% of the mothers who are unemployed and over 85% of the mothers who
are sick or unable to work completed only lower education or vocational education.
Burgess and Greaves (2013) obtain similar results with respect to ethnic minorities,
which they attribute to negative stereotyping of particular groups in society.
4.2 Determinants of Track Placement
Figure 2 shows how children are allocated to tracks according to the two assessment
measures. The figure is divided into three panels. Panel A documents track placement
of children who are faced with TAi < TSi . Panel B displays track placement of those
with TAi = TSi and panel C shows placement of those with TAi > TSi . Placement in
the category labelled “else” represents those children who are placed in a track that
was recommended by neither the subjective assessment nor the objective assessment
measure. In almost all of these cases the subjective and objective assessment measures
differ by more than three levels and track placement is in between these two measures.
In some cases track placement is higher or lower than both assessment measures
indicate. In the latter case our data suggest that it is more likely that track placement
is higher than both assessment measures would merit.
The bars in Panel A of Fig. 2 suggest that when TAi < TSi children are more likely
to be placed according to TAi than TSi (40.2 vs. 17.9%). At first sight, this suggests
that secondary schools seem to act in a relatively conservative way by following the
lower of the two signals. They seem to attach more value to the teacher’s assessment
of the child’s ability relative to the test score. At the same time, the share of children
placed in tracks that do not directly correspond with one of the assessment measures
is relatively large (41.9%). The numbers in Panel C suggest that secondary schools
are more likely to follow the teacher’s assessment even when it is higher than the test
score. More than two thirds of the population with TAi > TSi is placed according to
TAi . Also the share of children placed in tracks that do not directly correspond with
the assessment measures is relatively low compared to the case in which TAi < TSi .
Combinedwith the information fromPanelA, a picture emerges that secondary schools
attachmore value to the teacher’s assessment of children’s ability relative to test scores.
Note that the teacher’s assessment of a child’s ability is on average higher than the
test score would suggest. Finally, the statistics in Panel B of Fig. 2 reveal that when
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Fig. 2 Track placement for different objective and subjective assessment measures
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both assessment measures give the same signal about children’s ability almost all
children are placed in the corresponding track. Nevertheless, 7.3% of the children
are allocated to a different track. Upon closer inspection most of these children are
allocated to higher tracks relative to what the teacher’s assessment and the test score
recommend. Overall, it seems to be the case that secondary schools have a preference
to allocate children according to the teacher’s assessment measure and/or according
to the assessment that signals the highest ability.
We continue by estimating the determinants of track placement in 7th grade. Table
3 presents the estimation results of Eq. (1). The estimates are coefficients from ordered
probit models where track placement (measured between 1 and 8) is the dependent
variable. In thefirst twocolumnsweeither use the test score or the teacher assessment to
estimate the determinants of trackplacement.As expected,weobserve a strongpositive
relation between both the test score and track placement and teacher assessment and
track placement. When we rescale the test score and the teacher assessment by the cut
points in their respective regressions we observe that a one standard deviation increase
in the test score (teacher assessment) bridges 35.1% (35.2%) of the gap between the
lowest and the highest track placement, without adding any other control variables. In
column (3) we add both the test score and the teacher assessment to the model. The
test score and teacher assessment do not seem to be orthogonal. When the test score
and teacher assessment are both added to the model we observe that a one standard
deviation increase in the test score (teacher assessment) bridges 11.7% (25.2%) of
the gap between the lowest and the highest track placement, without adding any other
control variables. The difference in coefficients between the test score and teacher
assessment is significant. An important observation is that teacher assessment seems
to be a better predictor of track placement than the test score. In columns (4)–(6)we add
control variables, primary school fixed effects and ameasure of children’sGPAonmath
and language tests in previous years, respectively. Our estimates remain approximately
the same in these different specifications. Overall, both teacher assessment and the test
score seem likely to be important determinants of track placement in 7th grade. From
our final specification in column (6) we conclude that teacher assessment appears to
play a more important role in determining track placement compared to the test score.
The estimated coefficient is about twice as large. This finding seems to be consistent
with the subjective assessment measure having more information about the child’s
ability than the objective assessment measure.
In columns (7)–(12)we investigate the determinants of track placement in 9th grade.
Track placement in 9th grade consists of six categories as over time the combination
tracks disappear and children get allocated to their final track.13 Columns (7)–(9) show
the results for the sample of children who have not switched tracks between 7th and
9th grade. We obtain estimated coefficients that suggest that teacher assessment is still
the best predictor of track placement for the children who have not switched tracks.
13 Secondary schools use combination tracks in the first year(s) of secondary education due to the uncer-
tainty around ability. By using combination tracks schools can observe performance and allocate children
to the most appropriate track after learning more about the ability. The combination tracks disappear into
the neighboring main tracks. For example, children placed in track T2/T3 in the first year are expected to
be re-placed in track T2 or T3 in year 2 or 3. Such a re-placement is not considered as switching tracks.
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Columns (10)–(12) show the results for the entire sample of children we observe
in 9th grade. We obtain a set of coefficients that suggests that there is no statistically
significant difference between the predictive power of the test score and teacher assess-
ment. These results indicate that the teacher is the best predictor of children’s’ ability
both in 7th grade and later on in the children’s secondary school career. However, the
results also show that the predictive power of the teacher compared to the predictive
power of the test score falls over time. A possible explanation for this is that children
who were initially assessed too favourable by the teacher have switched to a lower
track in the first three years of secondary education.
To take into account the covariation between the teacher assessment and the test
score we also estimate the predictive power of the teacher assessment on track place-
ment in 7th and 9th grade after correcting for the predictive power of the test score.
This seems a natural thing to do because the teacher knows the test score of the child
when the assessment is made. We find that the teacher’s assessment is still highly
predictive of track placement in 7th and 9th grade after controlling for the covariation
between the teacher’s assessment and the test score. The estimated coefficients of these
analyses can be found in Appendix E.
5 Switching Tracks
Children could be allocated sub-optimally across different levels of secondary edu-
cation. Suboptimal allocation encourages switching, which comes with a cost of
suboptimal human capital investments and adjustment cost. In addition, children could
have to stay for an additional period in the secondary education system because tran-
sitions between tracks are not always smooth. Note that switching tracks is the most
drastic measure that secondary schools can take when children are not performing up
to expectations. For example, the first option for children who are not able to keep up
with the required level is to let them repeat the same grade. In the event that the school
believes that grade retention will be insufficient, children have to switch tracks. Fur-
thermore, it is possible that the costs of switching tracks are different when children
switch up tracks compared to when they switch down tracks. It is likely that the costs
of switching tracks for children who switch down are more related to demotivation
and that the cost of switching up tracks are more related to previous underinvestment
of human capital.
5.1 Documenting Switchers
Figure 3 shows that approximately 24% of children switches tracks between 7th and
9th grade. Most of the switches (55%) happen from 8th to 9th grade.14 Approximately
71% of all children who switch between tracks switch down and only about 29% of all
children who switch between tracks switch up. Switches are defined for all 11 tracks
and are counted based on major switches, i.e., at least two steps. We observe that most
14 The online appendix D documents the characteristics of switchers in detail and presents the coefficients
of probit models.
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Fig. 3 Track switching between initial track allocation in 7th grade and 9th grade. Note: The figure shows
the total number of switchers. Negative numbers on the horizontal axis are defined as switches down and
positive numbers as switches up. The blue and red bars add up to 100% individually. (Color figure online)
children who switch tracks switch two tracks up or down.15 Furthermore, correlations
between teacher assessment, test score, track placement and switching are negative.
This is due to the nature of our data. Since we observe track switches until 9th grade,
we capture almost all of the switches in the T1 track but we capture less of the switches
in the T2 and T3 tracks as these children still have the opportunity to switch tracks
after 9th grade. This finding is confirmed by results from the Inspectorate of Education
for all children in The Netherlands (Education Inspectorate 2007).
Figure 4 shows track switching by differences in objective and subjective assess-
ment measures. The figure is divided into three panels. The first panel documents the
track switching of children who are faced with TAi < TSi . The second panel displays
track switching of those with TAi = TSi and the final panel shows switching of those
with TAi > TSi . Track placement is equal to either TAi , TSi or “else”. The category
labelled “else” represents those children who are placed in different tracks than the
measures advised. Note that the number of switchers is determined on the basis of all
11 possible tracks.
The bars in Panel A suggest that when TAi < TSi fewer children switch between
tracks when they have been placed according to TAi and more children switch when
they are placed according to TSi or in another track than either measurement pointed
at. Comparison of TAi and TSi in Panel A suggests that those who are placed according
to TSi are more likely to switch up consistent with the argumentation that the teacher
15 Our data includes 1266 switchers. Of these switchers 43 children switch down/up multiple tracks and
65 children switch both up and down between 7th and 9th grade. We analyze overall switches which means
that we refer to 1158 switchers (i.e., 1266 − 43 − 65 = 1158). Figure 3 includes all 1266 switchers.
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Fig. 4 Track switching for different objective and subjective assessment measures
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assessment is generally more generous about the children’s ability than the test score.
The numbers in Panel C suggest that although secondary schools are more likely to
follow the teacher’s assessment, even when it is higher than the test score, the number
of switchers is relatively low when children are allocated based on TAi . In addition,
if children are placed according to TSi more children switch up. Finally, the statistics
in Panel B of Fig. 4 reveal that children switch less often if TPi = TAi = TSi .
The overall picture that emerges from Fig. 4 is that children placed according to
TAi have a lower probability to switch tracks relative to children placed according
to TSi . This conclusion seems to hold regardless of the difference between TAi and
TSi . In addition, children allocated in accordance with the highest (lowest) of the two
assessment measures seem to have a higher probability to switch down (up) a track,
which is consistent with overassessment (underassessment) of a child’s ability.
5.2 Determinants of Track Switching
We continue by presenting the results of analysing probit models in which we estimate
the probability of switching. Columns (1)–(3) in Table 4 present marginal effects for
overall switching, columns (4)–(6) present marginal effects for switching down and
columns (7)–(9) present marginal effects for switching up. The third specification
in all three models includes control variables and secondary school fixed effects.
Furthermore, standard errors are clustered at the secondary school level.
The estimated coefficients in column (3) suggest that children who are placed in
a track according to the teacher’s assessment (and not according to the test score)
are 9.8% more likely to switch tracks, children who are placed according to the test
score (and not according to the teacher assessment) are 17.9% more likely to switch
tracks and children who are placed not according to the teacher’s assessment or the
test score are 16.7% more likely to switch tracks compared to the base level.16 The
coefficients displayed in column (6) suggest that children placed in a track according
to the teacher’s assessment (and not according to their test score) are more likely
to switch down, whereas children who are placed according to their test score (and
not according to their teacher’s assessment) or according to neither of the assessment
measures are not more likely to switch down. Finally, from the estimated coefficients
shown in column (9) we observe that children who are placed in a track according to
their test score (and not according to their teacher’s assessment) and children who are
placed according to neither of the assessment measures are more likely to switch up,
whereas children placed according to their teacher’s assessment (and not according
to their test score) are not more likely to switch down. Finally, children for whom
TPi = TAi = TSi are least likely to switch tracks. For these children there is only little
uncertainty about themost efficient track placement. These results seem to suggest that
children are less likely to switchwhen they are allocated to tracks based on the teacher’s
assessment. However, the teacher’s assessment is generally more favourable than the
test score about a child’s ability. Therefore, children who are allocated according to
16 The base level in all these analyses is when TPi = TAi = TSi or TPi = TAi and TPi = TSi but
TAi = TSi . For example: TA = T 3, TS = T 2 and PL = T 2/T 3.
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Table 5 Determinants of scores on math or language tests in 9th grade
Math or language test 9th grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test score 0.027* 0.006 0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Teacher advice 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.060***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Secondary school FE No No No Yes
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.082 0.082 0.085
Estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the children’s score on a math
or language test in 9th grade. Test score and teacher advice are standardized. Standard errors are clustered
at the secondary school level. ***, **, * at 1, 5 and 10% significance levels respectively. We control for
track placement in 7th grade, gender, age, region of birth of child, father and mother, education level of
father and mother, labour market position of father and mother, days worked of father and mother, if the
child lives with both parents, area code of residence and region
the teacher’s assessment are more likely to switch down and children allocated to the
test score are more likely to switch up.17
6 Test Scores in 9th Grade
For a subsample of children we have data about a math and language test score in 9th
grade. Children were randomly assigned questions in either math, language or both.
We use the answers to 11 math questions or 8 language questions that have been asked
to children in all tracks. This results in test scores of n = 1812 children.
Table 5 documents the estimated coefficients of an analysis in which we investigate
the effect of teacher assessment and test scores in 6th grade on the test score in 9th
grade. The coefficients shown are coefficients from OLS regressions in which the
dependent variable is the child’s score on the test in 9th grade. The test score and
teacher assessment are standardized and standard errors are clustered at the secondary
school level. Columns (1) and (2) show that both the test score and the teacher’s
assessment in 6th grade are positively and statistically significant related to children’s
test score in 9th grade. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients suggest that the test
score and the teacher’s assessment are not orthogonal. Put together, the teacher’s
assessment seems to be able to predict the test score in 9th grade more accurately.
17 In the online appendix F we look at the type of school children attend. We see that most of the track
switching takes place within the pre-vocational education tracks. This is consistent with findings from the
Dutch Education Inspectorate. Furthermore, in the switching analyses we control for the type of school
(level of comprehensiveness) children attend.
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This effect is robust to the inclusion of secondary school fixed effects, which suggests
that this effect is not specific to certain (characteristics of) schools.18
We also estimate the predictive power of the teacher assessment for children’s test
scores in 9th grade after controlling for the covariation between the teacher’s assess-
ment and the test score in 6th grade. This analysis results in an estimated coefficient of
0.0395 that is statistically significant at the 10% level. So, even after controlling for the
covariation between the teacher’s assessment and the test score, the assessment seems
to be more predictive of later test scores compared to the 6th grade test score. It seems
likely that the teacher’s assessment also captures other skills, besides intelligence, that
are important determinants of children’s school career.19
Table 6 shows the results of an analysis in which we explain the effects of switching
on 9th grade test scores. We compare children who have switched tracks to children
whohave not. The coefficients are fromOLS regressionswith the test score in 9th grade
as the dependent variable. The standard errors are clustered at the secondary school
level. Table 6 has three panels. The top panel presents estimates for overall switching,
the middle panel presents estimates for switching down and the bottom panel presents
estimates for switching up. In the top panel the coefficients for switching show that for
children in the pre-vocational track (GL in Fig. 1), the pre-higher education track and
the pre-university track there is a statistically significant negative effect of switching
tracks on the 9th grade test score. Second, the coefficients displayed in the middle
panel of the table suggest that children in the pre-vocational track (GL) and children
in the pre-higher education track experience a statistically significant negative effect of
switching down tracks. Finally, in the bottompanel of Table 6 the displayed coefficients
suggest that children in the pre-vocational education track (TL) and children in the
pre-university track experience a statistically significant negative effect of switching
up tracks. Overall, it seems to be the case that children who have switched tracks
experience a negative effect on their test score in 9th grade compared to children who
have not switched tracks.20
7 Conclusions
This paper documents and interprets the determinants of track placement in the tran-
sition from primary to secondary education and the first three years of secondary
education. Our main findings suggest that both objective and subjective assessment
measures of ability in 6th grade predict track placement in 7th grade. The subjective
18 The test in 9th grade is limited (8–11 questions) and is a low-stakes test. The correlation between
children’s test score in 6th grade and their test score in 9th grade is 0.16 and statistically significant at the
1% level. For the analyses in Table 6 one could argue that the teacher assessment is better at predicting
children’s test score in 9th grade as the teacher assessment likely captures other elements next to children’s
ability that affect children test score on a low-stakes test more compared to their test score on a high-stakes
test. The test score in 6th grade could be a better predictor of children’s test score on a high-stakes test but
such information is unavailable.
19 This analysis can be found in online Appendix E.
20 Here we assume that track switches are caused by performance and not related to unobservable charac-
teristics, such as illness or behavioral problems.
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assessment measure of the teacher’s assessment of the child’s ability contains more
information as the teacher has more knowledge about the child’s socio-economic
background, the objective test score in 6th grade and previous test scores and other
results. Our estimates suggest that the teacher’s assessment in primary school is a
better predictor of a child’s track placement and subsequent performance in secondary
school compared to the 6th grade test score. We also observe that approximately 24%
of our population of children switches tracks between 7th and 9th grade. We obtain
a set of estimates that suggests that children are the least likely to switch when they
are allocated to a track based on the teacher’s assessment. However, when we look at
switching down and up separately our estimates suggest that children placed in tracks
according to teacher assessment are more likely to switch down and children placed in
tracks according to the test score and children allocated not according to any of these
assessment measures are more likely to switch up. Finally, test scores in 9th grade
seem to be better predicted by the teacher’s assessment compared to 6th grade test
scores. In addition, switchers obtain lower test scores on this 9th grade test relative to
children who remain in their initial tracks.
This research uses a straightforward research design and explores a dataset which
includes information on assessment measures, track placement and subsequent per-
formance. Future work could extend our analysis by using for example more detailed
information about different parts of the objective assessment measure. Test scores
could be decomposed in a language and math component, which could benefit the
analysis of allocation and performance in secondary school. In addition, the relation-
ship with individual characteristics is interesting to explore further. We have used a
limited number of covariates because of data limitations, but future data collection
efforts also include measures of behaviour and personality traits. This information
could help in estimating more precise coefficients and possibly additional determi-
nants of performance and allocation. Finally, the children in our database are followed
throughout the rest of their educational careers. This opens avenues for future research
about longer term effects of track allocation.
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